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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts in Florida and across the nation favor arbitration' as a mecha-
nism of resolving disputes,2 which has made arbitration the most popular
* J.D. Candidate, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, 2005;
M.S., University of Florida, 1996; B.S., University of Florida, 1992. The author would like to
thank his wife Dori, his daughter Jacqueline, and his family for all of their love and support
during the writing of this Note. The author would also like to recognize the following parties
for their assistance: The Honorable Thomas M. Lynch, IV and his judicial assistant Bonnie
Sandier; The Honorable Charles Greene; the Coral Springs City Attorney's Office; the Clerks
of Court at the Fourth District Court of Appeal; the staff of NOVA LAW REVIEW; his professors
at the Shepard Broad Law Center; and the other three members of the Four Horsemen.
1. Arbitration is the process of resolving disputes by a neutral third party after the arbi-
trator hears from both parties. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (7th ed. 1999). The character-
istics of arbitration include written agreements to resolve controversies through arbitration,
non-formal methods, neutral arbiters, and binding awards that can be enforced in court. Jef-
1
Gerber: The Validity of Binding Arbitration Agreements and Children's Per
Published by NSUWorks, 2003
NOVA LA WREVIEW
method of alternative dispute resolution.3 The rise in the popularity of arbi-
tration has resulted from the view that arbitration allows parties to settle con-
troversies in a time and cost-efficient manner without the formalities of tradi-
tional litigation.4 Commercial enterprises have traditionally chosen to use
arbitration to settle the disagreements that arise in an array of commercial
settings. 5 A primary reason for the recent popularity of commercial arbitra-
tion is because arbitrators often have the same background and working
knowledge in the specific area of business as the parties involved in a dis-
pute.6 Some businesses-including tour operators and recreation-based or-
ganizations, for example-are beginning to use arbitration provisions in their
agreements not only to resolve any disputes that may arise over the perform-
ance of contracts, but to reduce any potential liability from personal injury
claims submitted by participants.7
The future of commercial arbitration in Florida as it relates to the per-
sonal injury claims of children will change8 in the aftermath of Shea v.
Global Travel Marketing, Inc.9 In a case of first impression in Florida,' ° the
Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that parents cannot bind their minor
children to arbitrate personal injury claims." The court also certified the
frey M. Schalley, Article, Eliminate Violence from Sports Through Arbitration, Not the Civil
Courts, 8 SPORTS LAW. J. 181, 196 (2001).
2. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Martha A. Gottfried, Inc. v.
Paulette Koch Real Estate, Inc., 778 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Info.
Tech. & Eng'g Corp. v. Reno, 813 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); 1
THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5:1 (3d ed. 2003); Michael A. Bagot, Jr. &
Dana A. Henderson, Not Party, Not Bound? Not Necessarily: Binding Third Parties to Mari-
time Arbitration, 26 TUL. MAR. L.J. 413, 418 (2002).
3. 1 OEHMKE, supra note 2.
4. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473,473-75 (1987); Schalley, supra note 1, at 195.
5. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitra-
tion, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. I (1997).
6. See id.; see also 1 OEHMKE, supra note 2 (discussing the variety of commercial dis-
putes that are resolved through arbitration).
7. Laurie Cunningham, Parents Can't Waive Children's Rights, DAILY Bus. REV., May
22, 2003, at Al.
8. See id.; Amicus Brief of the Acad. of Fla. Trial Lawyers at 1, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L.
Weekly at D2004 (No. 4D02-910). For purposes of this Note, the term child(ren) will be used
interchangeably and has the same definition as the word minor. A minor is an "infant or per-
son who is under the age of legal competence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (6th ed.
1990).
9. 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2004 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Shea I].
10. Id.atD2005.
It. Id.; see Cunningham, supra note 7. The court originally reversed the trial court's
arbitration order and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claims brought forth by
the decedent's father in a ruling issued on April 23, 2003. Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., Inc.,
[Vol. 28:1:167
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issue to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great public impor-
tance. 2 This Note will discuss the court's reasoning in Shea and assert that
the court's primary holding was a proper public policy decision in accord
with similar cases in other jurisdictions under parens patriae, which is the
ability of the state to protect persons of legal disability who cannot ade-
quately protect their legal interests, including children. 3 However, portions
of the court's reasoning and analysis were ambiguous. By not clearly articu-
lating significant issues affecting state and federal law, the court does not
provide any closure to the issues raised in Shea;4 on the contrary, the court's
approach casts doubt on the validity and practicality of the ruling.'5 "In order
to eliminate any uncertainty or confusion as to the applicability of the result
in this case statewide"' 6 as it relates to parental discretion, 7 the state's econ-
omy,' 8 judicial administration, 9 and other aspects of society in the state, the
Supreme Court of Florida needs to resolve the ambiguities of the Shea
panel's rationale.
Part I will survey similar cases involving arbitration clauses and chil-
dren's personal injury claims in other jurisdictions to illustrate the novelty of
this issue. Although cases like Shea are rare, this section will show that there
is already a split among and within jurisdictions concerning the validity of
binding arbitration provisions and the personal injury claims of minors. Part
II will provide the factual and procedural background of Shea that begins
with the tragic and gruesome death of an eleven-year-old boy. Part III will
discuss the court's rationale and its emphasis on the public policy concerns
28 Fla. L. Weekly D1009, DI0 11 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Shea 11].
The court withdrew its prior opinion and substituted a new opinion on August 27, 2003.
Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
12. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006. Article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Consti-
tution gives the Supreme Court of Florida the discretion to review the ruling of a district court
of appeal that presents a question certified by the supreme court as being of "great public
importance." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4); e.g., FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(B)(i). The issue
the Shea panel has certified to the Supreme Court of Florida states: "Whether a parent's
agreement in a commercial travel contract to binding arbitration on behalf of a minor child
with respect to prospective tort claims arising in the course of such travel is enforceable as to
the minor." Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006. No information was available on the status
of the certification action at the time of this Note.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990); see Cunningham, supra note 7.
14. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
15. See id.
16. Appellee's Motion for Certification to the Fla. Sup. Ct. of a Question of Great Public
Importance at 3, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2004 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003) (No. 4D02-
910).
17. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
18. See id.
19. See id.
2003]
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of parents entering into contracts on behalf of their children in the form of
parental waivers and other exculpatory agreements that contain arbitration
provisions.
Although some critics believe the Shea court has improperly interfered
with a parent's ability to raise his or her children,20 Part IV will assert that the
ruling made by the panel was proper under public policy and parens patriae,
including the decision to validate parental waivers for school-sponsored or
community oriented activities for minors. Part V will assess the weaknesses
of the court's rationale, specifically the court's silence on whether the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act2' or Florida Arbitration Code22 should have been applied.
Another inadequacy of the Shea court's rationale is its ambiguity concerning
the activities where parental waivers that include arbitration agreements
would be permissible under public policy.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CASE LAW INVOLVING THE BINDING OF CHILDREN'S
PERSONAL INJURY, NEGLIGENCE, OR TORT CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION
With some exceptions,2 3 agreements that generally bind minors to arbi-
tration involve insurance contracts24 or separation agreements that concern
child custody, support, and visitation rights.25 However, cases on point con-
cerning the issue of whether parents can compel their children to resolve
personal injury claims through binding arbitration are rare.26  Despite the
20. See id.
21. 9U.S.C.§§ 1-16(2000).
22. FLA. STAT. § 682.01-.22 (2002).
23. 1 MICHAEL DOMKE & GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
§ 10:10 (rev. ed. 1999). The exceptions include controversies where the claims of a child are
not submitted to arbitration unless there is a court order issued. Id. The court order can be
issued after a parent or personal representative of the minor files an application with the court,
unless the controversy is an insurance claim. Id.
24. ld.; see also Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Cal. 1965) (holding that a child can
be bound to arbitrate claims under health care contract because parent has the right and duty to
care for child). Although this Note will not focus on the legality of arbitration agreements and
medical insurance claims or health care for minors, it should be noted that the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Shea found that the trial court erroneously relied on Doyle in its analysis.
Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
25. I DOMKE & WILNER, supra note 23.
26. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir. 2002); Troshak
v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401693, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 2,
1998); Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 836 (Ohio I 1th Ct. App. 1998); Shannon P. Duffy,
Parents Can't Sign Away Child's Potential Claim, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 7, 1998, at I
(discussing Troshak). Cross was a case of first impression in Ohio, and in Troshak and
Fleetwood, the federal courts had to determine how the supreme courts of Pennsylvania and
[Vol. 28:1:167
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infrequency of these cases, there is a split among and within jurisdictions
regarding the validity of a child being bound by a parent to settle claims
through an arbitrator rather than by a jury.27
A. Children Cannot be Bound to Arbitrate Claims
In Troshak v. Terminix International Corp. ,28 a minor was rendered un-
conscious by toxic fumes produced by a pesticide treatment of the minor's
house. 29 When the minor's parents filed personal injury claims against Ter-
minix,3° the company removed the case to federal court and moved to stay
litigation pending arbitration-including the child's claims-because the
child's father had agreed to arbitrate any controversies arising under the
company's service agreement.3" The district court found that the father and
mother's claims were bound by the arbitration agreement.32 Since there were
no Pennsylvania cases that directly dealt with binding minors to arbitration
clauses, 33 the district court had to determine how the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania would rule on the matter.34  The court turned to relevant federal
cases that held parents could not waive the legal claims of their children sim-
ply because of the parental relationship.35 Based on these cases, the district
Texas, respectively, would rule on the issue. See Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1076; Troshak, 1998
WL 401963, at *4; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836.
27. See Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1077; Costanza v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 02-1492,
2002 WL 31528447, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2002); Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *4; Ac-
comazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs. Inc., 15 P.3d 1153, 1156 (Idaho 2000); Cross, 724 N.E.2d at
836.
28. No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401693, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998).
29. See Duffy, supra note 26. The minor's name was Richard Troshak, Ill. His father,
Richard Troshak, 11 was not knocked out by the fumes of the termite control treatment, but
was found "stumbling in an incoherent state." Id.
30. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *3. The Troshaks also filed suit for property damages
to their house, and Susan Troshak-the mother and wife of the victims, respectively-sought
recovery for a loss of consortium. Id.
3 I. Id. at * 1-2. The father assented to the terms of the contract when he signed the com-
pany's "Termite Service Plan" agreement. Id. at *2.
32. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *2-3; Duffy, supra note 26, at 6. Although Susan
Troshak did not sign the Terminix contract, the court still found that she was bound to the
agreement under Pennsylvania law that presumes that one spouse has the power to act for the
other spouse in respect to the properties that are jointly held. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at
*3; Duffy, supra note 26, at 6.
33. Troshak v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401693, at *3
(E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998); Duffy, supra note 26, at 6.
34. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *4.
35. Id. at *3-4; see also Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Junior Coll., 630 F.
Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that Pennsylvania law prevents parents from releasing
claims of minors); Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140, 143
2003]
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court found that a child could not be bound by his parents to arbitrate per-
sonal injury claims when the minor had the right to file claims in court.36
The court stated:
If a parent cannot prospectively release the potential [tort] claims
of a minor child, then a parent does not have authority to bind a
minor child to an arbitration provision that requires the minor to
waive their right to have potential claims for personal injury filed
in a court of law.37
In Accomazzo v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc.,38 a child was en-
rolled in a private educational program for juveniles with emotional, behav-
ioral, and academic difficulties. 39  The enrollment contract signed by the
child's parents included an arbitration provision that required all disputes
arising from the agreement to be submitted to binding arbitration."n When
the child was injured in a physical confrontation with one of the school's
counselors during a counseling session,4 the minor's parents brought claims
of battery, negligence, and violation of state laws protecting children.42 The
school moved to stay litigation and bind the child to the arbitration provision
signed by his parents, but the motion was denied by the district court.43 In
affirming the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court of Idaho ruled that
the minor was not bound to the arbitration provision based on the language in
the contract.
44
In Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. v. Gaskamp,45 a child living in her fam-
ily's new mobile home began to suffer from breathing difficulties and had to
be hospitalized because of a respiratory disease caused by exposure to for-
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that a release signed by parent does not protect defendant from mi-
nor's cause of action).
36. Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *4.
37. Id.
38. 15 P.3d 1153 (Idaho 2000).
39. Id. at 1154.
40. Id. at 1155.
41. Id. at 1156.
42. Id. at 1155. The Accomazzos also brought causes of action for breach of contract,
common law fraud, violation of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, and negligence. Acco-
mazzo, 15 P.3d at 1155.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1156. Although the court held that the child was not compelled to arbitrate, the
Accomazzo parents were bound to arbitrate the battery, negligence, and state children's pro-
tection claims because the waiver was considered and consented to by the parents and CEDU
Educational Services when the contract was signed. Id.
45. 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 28:1l: 167
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maldehyde.46 The parents brought personal injury claims on behalf of their
children against the manufacturer of the home, the home seller, the manufac-
turer of particles in the home, and the financing company.47 Two defendants
responded by moving to compel arbitration against the entire Gaskamp fam-
ily because the parents had signed a contract containing an arbitration provi-
sion that "knowingly and voluntarily" waived the family's right to a jury
trial.48 Although the children did not sign the agreement, and the Gaskamp
parents did not expressly agree to submit their children's claims to arbitra-
tion,49 the district court ruled that the children were bound to settle their
claims out of court because the children's use of the mobile home derived
from the parents' use of the property.5° The Gaskamps appealed."
Like the federal court in Troshak, the appellate court in Fleetwood had
to determine how the state's supreme court would rule on the issue since the
matter had never been heard before in Texas. 2 The court applied Texas con-
tract law relating to third-party beneficiaries and non-signatories.5 3 Before
Fleetwood, Texas case law held that non-signatories were bound to arbitrate
when the non-signatory party brings suit on the contract and the non-
signatory was a third-party beneficiary. 54 After its analysis, however, the
Fleetwood panel reversed the district court's ruling and found that the chil-
46. Id. at 1071-72. All of the members of the Gaskamp family-including two other
Gaskamp children-suffered health problems from the formaldehyde exposure. Id. at 1071.
47. Id. at 1072. The Gaskamps filed suit in Mississippi state court against, respectively,
Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., Manufactured Bargains, Georgia-Pacific Corporation (Georgia-
Pacific), and Bombadier Capital. Id.
48. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1071-72. Fleetwood and Georgia-Pacific filed their motions
in the Southern District of Texas. Id. The arbitration agreement was part of a financing
agreement for the home. Id. at 1071.
49. Id. at 1074 n.2.
50. Id. at 1072-73. The district court did not cite any authority for its rationale and hold-
ing. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1072-73.
51. Id. at 1071. In addition to arguing that their children were not bound to arbitrate, the
Gaskamps also asserted that the arbitration agreement should be declared void because of
procedural unconscionability. Id.
52. Id. at 1076.
53. Id. at 1074; Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 432. Third-party beneficiaries are
not parties to contracts, but still benefit from the promises made in the contracts. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (6th ed. 1990). A non-signatory is a party who does not personally
sign a contract or agree to the document through an agent. Contra id. at 1381. Nevertheless,
a non-signatory becomes a party to the contract. Id.
54. Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 2002). Under the
common law of contracts and agency-which the appellate court considered in its analysis-
there are seven general exceptions providing a basis to bind non-signatories to arbitration
agreements: agency, assumption/implied conduct, alter ego/veil piercing, assumption, estop-
pel, incorporation by references, successor in interest, and third-party beneficiaries. Id. at
1076; 1 DoMKE & WILNER, supra note 23; Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 436.
2003]
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dren were not compelled to arbitrate their causes of action "simply because
they are minors and their claims are related to those of their parents. 55 In
addition, because the children did not sign and were not bound to the agree-
ment, they were incidental-not third-party--beneficiaries, and their cause
of action was based in tort, not on the contract.56
B. Children Can be Bound to Arbitrate Claims
There is a split within the Fifth Circuit regarding a parent's ability to
bind children to arbitration to settle their personal injury claims. 17 The par-
ents in Costanza v. Allstate Insurance Co.58 brought claims against various
businesses and organizations for the personal injuries their children suffered
when water leaked into their home. 9 In response, two defendants moved to
compel arbitration for the family's claims based on the arbitration agreement
signed by the parents.6" Relying on Fleetwood, the parents claimed that their
children should not have their claims settled by arbitration because the mi-
nors were not third party beneficiaries or bringing a cause of action on the
contract.6' The district court held that the children could seek personal injury
claims as it related to the homebuilder's contract and the other contracts at
bar because the children were not enforcing the provisions of these agree-
ments nor were they third-party beneficiaries.62 However, the Costanza
panel held that the children were bound to arbitrate their claims pursuant to
the arbitration clause of the limited warranty agreement because the court
reasoned that the children were pursuing claims under the contract, not in
55. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1076.
56. Id. at 1077; e.g., 1 DOMKE, supra note 23; 1 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 12:9 (rev. ed. 2003); see Children not Bound by Parents' Agreement to Arbi-
trate, 13 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 207, 208 (2002). The Gaskamp parents, however,
were still bound to arbitrate their claims because, as contract signatories, they did not raise any
valid defenses against the arbitration provisions. Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1077.
57. See Doug Uloth & Hamilton Rial, Enforcing Arbitration Against Nonsignatories, 65
TEX. B.J. 802, 806-07 (2002).
58. No. CIV.A.02-1492, 2002 WL 31528447, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2002).
59. Id. The Costanzas filed claims against the manufacturer who designed the exterior
insulation and finish system for their house, the homebuilder, the installer of the system,
Allstate Insurance, the Residential Warranty Corporation (RWC), the Western Pacific Mutual
Insurance Company (WPIC), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Id.
60. Id. at * 1-2. RWC and WPIC moved to stay the proceedings after the Costanza par-
ents had signed an application for a limited warranty that included a binding arbitration clause.
Id.
61. Costanza, 2002 WL 31528447, at *6 (relying on Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1073).
62. Id. at *7.
[Vol. 28:1:167
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tort.63 In staying the children's proceedings, the court stated that the children
"cannot avail themselves of the benefits of the contract and not be bound by
its restrictions. 64
Although a personal injury claim was not involved, the issue of whether
a child was bound to an arbitration agreement over other tortious acts was
raised in Cross v. Carnes.65 In Cross, the minor first brought defamation and
fraudulent concealment claims against the "Sally Jessy Raphael" television
program.66 The show moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration based
on a release and consent form containing an arbitration provision the mother
had signed on her daughter's behalf.6 The arbitration clause stated that the
minor would arbitrate any controversy arising from the show's consent and
release form or her appearance on the program. 68 The trial court stayed the
proceedings, and Cross appealed. 69 Ohio's Eleventh District Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the ruling, basing its rationale on cases in other jurisdictions
where parents could bind their children's claims to arbitration.7 ° The court
also relied on a ruling made by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 724 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 11 th Ct. App. 1998).
66. Id. at 830. Heather Cross's (Heather) claim was brought in Ohio by and through her
mother Karen Cross (Cross) after Heather appeared on an episode entitled "Teen Girl Bul-
lies." Id. at 830-31. The Crosses allege that the theme of the program was fraudulently con-
cealed from them. Id. As part of the episode, Patti and Corinna Carnes falsely portrayed
Heather as a bully on national television. Id. at 831. Cross amended the complaint to rescind
the release and the arbitration clause for a lack of assent. Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 831.
67. Id.
68. See id. The provision read in part: "Any dispute arising out of this RELEASE,
and/or of my appearance on SALLY JESSY RAPHAELTM will be resolved by binding arbi-
tration ... in New York City and will be governed by the procedural and substantive law of
New York." Id. In general, tort claims like the one brought in Cross are not subject to arbi-
tration because torts typically do not arise out of contract but occur between parties who are
not familiar with each other, e.g., automobile accidents. Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability:
Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 931 (1996). However, Cross ap-
pears to be an exception to the rule. See id. at 932. It also appears that the producers of
"Sally Jesse Raphael" anticipated tortious conduct in Cross and included the arbitration
agreement in the contract in order to reduce any potential liability. See id. Although the lan-
guage of the arbitration provision in Cross .was broad, Cross's tort claim was arbitrable be-
cause the claim was related to the subject matter of the show contract. See Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD
A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 57:31 (4th ed. 2001).
69. Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio I th Ct. App. 1998).
70. Id. at 836; see also Doyle v. Giulucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965).
2003]
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parents could bind their children to exculpatory agreements to participate in
nonprofit sports activities.7" In its holding, the court stated:
The parent's consent and release to arbitration only specifies the
forum for resolution of the child's claim; it does not extinguish the
claim. Logically, if a parent has the authority to bring and conduct
a lawsuit on behalf of the child, he or she has the same authority to
choose arbitration as the litigation forum.
72
The analyses applied and conclusions reached by the respective courts
in the previous cases further illustrate the split involving binding arbitration
and children's personal injury claims. In determining if parents can bind
children to arbitration provisions, the courts will either apply a strict contract
analysis or a public policy analysis based on the parent-child relationship.73
The courts' rationales in Accomazzo, Fleetwood, and Costanza predomi-
nantly focused on the application of ordinary principles of state contract law,
instead of the ability of a parent to waive a minor's right to bring a cause of
action when that child suffers a personal injury.74 Despite applying like
analyses, the courts reached different conclusions.
75
In assessing the validity of the arbitration agreements in their respective
cases, the courts in Troshak and Cross both focused on the authority of par-
ents to release the potential claims of their children.76 However, the respec-
tive holdings in these cases stand in sharp contrast and reveal differing views
concerning arbitration agreements. The Troshak court viewed the arbitration
provision as a substantive release of liability, while the court in Cross rea-
soned that the arbitration agreement was merely a procedural matter.77 In
validating the arbitration provision for possible tortious conduct, the court's
holding in Cross implies that minors still have an opportunity to seek relief if
71. Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836 (citing Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201,
205 (Ohio 1998)).
72. Id.
73. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 2002); Co-
stanza v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.02-1492, 2002 WL 31528447, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Nov.
12, 2002); Troshak v. Terminix Int'l Corp., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401963, at *4
(E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998); Accomazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs., 15 P.3d 1153, 1156 (Idaho 2000);
Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836.
74. See Accomazzo, 15 P.3d at 1156; Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1074; Costanza, 2002 WL
31528447, at *6-7.
75. See Accomazzo, 15 P.3d at 1156; Fleetwood, 280 F.3d at 1074; Costanza, 2002 WL
31528447, at *7.
76. See Troshak, 1998 WL 401693, at *4; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836.
77. Troshak, 1998 WL 401963, at *5-6; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 836; Appellee's Answer
Brief at 8, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910).
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they are injured.78 Until additional cases that directly address this issue be-
come commonplace, other forums will have to determine what analyses to
apply and conclusions to reach on a case-by-case basis.
79
1II. A FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF SHEA
Before falling asleep on the night of July 19, 2000, Garrit Shea ("Gar-
rit") thanked his mother Molly Bruce Jacobs ("Jacobs") for taking him on an
African safari to Botswana and Zimbabwe.80 The expedition was organized
by Global Marketing Travel ("Global"), a Fort Lauderdale-based corporation
conducting business and offering tours for more than fifteen years as the
Africa Adventure Company.8' "I can't wait until tomorrow," Garrit said. 2
Tomorrow would be a day that was supposed to be the highlight of Gar-
rit's twenty-five day safari, which was Garrit's second African expedition. 3
The eleven-year-old boy from the Baltimore suburbs with a keen interest in
the animal kingdom was back in the African bush and coming into contact
with the wildlife he had grown to know, love, and respect.84 The straight-A
student, aspiring hockey goalie, and "gentle spirit"s also grew to appreciate
the diverse cultures of the bushmen, who he had traveled with on hunting
outings and danced with in their villages.86
Tomorrow never came for Garrit. While he slept alone in his tent on
the perimeter of the Xakanaxa Campsite in Botswana's Okavango Delta on
that fateful night, a pack of hyenas entered Garrit's tent, mauled him, and
78. See Schalley, supra note 1, at 202.
79. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc., 280 F.3d at 1076.
80. Brucie Jacobs, My Son Garrit, 'Little Bum' Tribute, BALT. SUN, Sept. 17, 2000, at
I H, available at http://www.sunspot.net.
81. Noah Bierman & Scott Hutchinson, Broward Firm Faces Suit in Safari Death of Boy,
11, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24, 2003, at 2B; Rafael A. Olmeda, Court Lets Suit Against Travel
Firm Go Ahead, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 24, 2003, at 4B; Cunningham, supra note 7.
82. Jacobs, supra note 80.
83. See Lynn Anderson & Tom Bowman, Brooklandville Boy Killed in Hyena Attack in
Botswana, BALT. SUN, July 20, 2000, at 24B, available at http://www.sunspot.net; Jacobs,
supra note 80; Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81. Garrit had made his first safari to Bot-
swana with Jacobs and his older brother in 1999. Id. Garrit's father, Mark Shea, who is di-
vorced from Jacobs, did not go on the expeditions in 1999 or 2000. id.
84. See Jacobs, supra note 80; Ann LoLordo, Mark Garrity Shea, 11, Loved Science,
Sports, BALT. SUN, July 24, 2000, at 4B, available at http://www.sunspot.net. Garrit was from
Brooklandville, Maryland, and owned dogs, cats, birds, a rooster, hens, lizards, and emus. Id.;
Anderson & Bowman, supra note 83. He collected an elephant tusk, a whale tooth, and a bear
claw during the family's various trips across the United States and to Africa, Australia, the
Caribbean, and Mexico. Id.
85. LoLordo, supra note 84 (quoting Garrit's great aunt Rachel Garrity).
86. See Jacobs, supra note 80.
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dragged him into the bush.87 Garrit's mother and the tour guides heard his
screams, but they were too late to stop the attack and were not able to search
out Garrit in the darkness.8 His mother and the guides did not find Garrit
until they discovered his body near the tour campsite the following day.89
Garrit had been decapitated. 90
Prior to their departure to Africa, Jacobs agreed to all of the terms of
Global's tour contract so she and Garrit could participate in the safari. 9' The
tour contract included a waiver that released Global for any liability that may
have occurred during the tour.92 The release stated in part:
I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, INDEMNIFY, and AGREE
NOT TO SUE THE AFRICA ADVENTURE COMPANY ... for
any and all losses, damages, or injuries or any claim or demand on
account of injury or emotional trauma ... or on account of death
resulting from any cause.. .while the undersigned is participating
in a tour or any travel or other arrangements by THE AFRICA
ADVENTURE COMPANY ....
Pursuant to a provision in the contract, Jacobs also assented that any
dispute arising from the agreement would be settled in the following manner:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agree-
ment, or the making, performance or interpretation thereof, shall
be settled by binding arbitration in Fort Lauderdale, FL, in accor-
dance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association then
existing, and judgment on the arbitration award may be entered in
any court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the contro-
versy.
94
87. Id.; Cunningham, supra note 7; Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81.
88. Cunningham, supra note 7. Jacobs was in a nearby tent recapping the day's events
into a tape recorder when the attack occurred. 1d.
89. Id.
90. Id. The legal counsel for Global Travel Marketing/The African Adventure Company
said that Garrit's death marked the first time that there had been a fatality on one of the com-
pany's tours. Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81.
91. Shea I, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004. The applicable provision of the contract reads:
"1, as parent or legal guardian of the below named minor, hereby give my permission for this
child or legal ward to participate in the trip and further agree, individually and on behalf of my
child or ward, to the terms of the above." Id. at D2005.
92. Id. at D2004.
93. Id.
94. Appellant's Brief at 5, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910).
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In 2001, Mark Shea ("Shea")-Garrit's father-brought suit against
Global as the personal representative of Garrit's estate, alleging that the
company's negligence led to his son's death.95 He attempted to recover
damages for pain and suffering under the Florida Wrongful Death Act,
96
which is intended to shift the losses resulting from an individual's untimely
demise from the decedent's survivors to the liable party.97 Global moved to
stay proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to the tour contract. 98 Shea
countered Global's motion on grounds that Jacobs did not have the legal
authority to waive her son's right to a jury trial via the arbitration provision,
and that Garrit and Shea were not parties to the agreement.99 The trial court
ruled that Garrit could be bound to the arbitration clause because parents
have the right to choose the forum for their children's claims, and Florida
and federal law favor arbitration.' Since Shea brought suit on behalf of
Garrit's estate, he was also bound to the provision.' Shea appealed.0 2
95. Cunningham, supra note 7; Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81. Shea alleged that
Garrit should not have been allowed to sleep alone in the tent, the tent was not properly se-
cured, the tour guides did not check to see if the tent was made safe by the tent's dual zipper
mechanism, and that a buildup of garbage on the perimeter of the camp attracted the hyenas.
See id.; Cunningham, supra note 7. Shea argued that the failure to take these precautions led
to Garrit's death. E.g., Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
96. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004; FLA. STAT. § 768.16-.27 (2002). A parent or
parents of a deceased child can recover for mental pain and suffering when the minor's injury
occurs. § 768.21(4). Jacobs also attempted to file a wrongful death suit against Global, but
the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling holding that Jacobs had to
arbitrate her claims against Global. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004; Jacobs v. Global
Travel Mktg., Inc., 796 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Cunningham, supra note 7.
Jacobs is currently in arbitration with Global. Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81.
97. § 768.17.
98. Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., Inc., No. 01-10128, 2002 WL 215330, at *1 (Fla. 17th
Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Shea III]. Global made an alternative motion to dismiss the
case pursuant to the arbitration agreement. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at *4.
101. Id. at *5. Shea argued that he should not have been bound to the agreement because
he did not sign the release. Shea 11, 2002 WL 215330, at *5. The trial court agreed. See id.
However, the court reasoned that since Shea did not bring a cause of action in an individual
capacity, the trial court found that Shea "stood" in Garrit's shoes by bringing suit on behalf of
Garrit's estate. Id. Therefore, since Garrit was bound to the arbitration provision, the estate's
personal representative was also bound. Id.
102. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
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IV. THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL'S ANALYSIS IN SHEA:
PUBLIC POLICY AND PARENS PA TR1AE
Since arbitration is strictly a creature of contract, °3 the Shea court ap-
plied Florida contract law to assess the arbitration agreement."° The court
addressed the validity of the provision in Shea by focusing its analysis on the
public policy concerns of parents contracting for their children. 5 Under
Florida law, a contract that violates public policy runs counter to the "public
right or the public welfare"'0 6 or an established societal interest.'0 7 The court
believed that the ability of parents to contract away the potential legal claims
of their children under circumstances not supported by public policy-
including commercial travel-was not acceptable under Florida law.' Per-
103. 1 OEHMKE, supra note 2, at § 5:2; McLaughlin, supra note 68, at 931; see also Acco-
mazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs., Inc., 15 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Idaho 2000) ("The question of arbi-
trability is a question of law properly decided by the court.").
104. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005. Global attempted to persuade the court that
Maryland contract law should have been used in the case under the doctrine of lex loci con-
tractus. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 19-21, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No.
4D02-910). Lex loci contractus denotes the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was
made and also signifies what law governs the contract. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (6th
ed. 1990). Global asserted that since Jacobs and Shea were residents of Maryland and all of
the material events concerning the tour contract took place in Maryland, that state's law
should govern the agreement. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 20-21, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L.
Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910). The appellate court rejected Global's claims because
Global never made the argument at trial. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004; see Appellant's
Reply Brief at 1, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910).
105. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005. The substantive definition of public policy was
first outlined in City of Leesburg v. Ware, 153 So. 87, 89 (Fla. 1934) (adopting the opinion of
Wannamaker, J., in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E.
505, 506-07 (Ohio 1916)). Under Florida law, public policy is the common sensibility and
conscience of communities across the state as it pertains to matters of health, safety, welfare,
and morals. Ware, 153 So. at 89 (adopting Kinney, 115 N.E. at 507).
106. At. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Beazley, 45 So. 761, 774 (Fla. 1907). Ironically, the
court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. held that contracts that are violative of public policy
"encourages negligence ... it would have a tendency to induce the employment of men less
prudent and careful, which would tend to endanger the lives of travelers." Id.
107. Ware, 153 So. at 89 (adopting Kinney, 1 5 N.E. at 507).
108. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006. The court recognized that health care, health
insurance, and "commonplace" or "school supported" activities as the types of functions
where parental waivers would be supported by public policy. Id. The court ruled that "[w]e
need not decide, here, what additional circumstances would support such a waiver." Id.
However, the Shea panel, basing its reasoning on Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696
N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1998), also found that "non-profit entities, their employees and volunteers
do not fall within the ambit of this opinion" because of the benefits those organizations and
individuals provide to children. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004. In Zivich, the Supreme
Court of Ohio validated the use of exculpatory agreements for "community recreational activi-
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mitting parental waivers in these circumstances, the court reasoned, would
defy public policy because minors would not have an opportunity to seek
legal relief. 9
In reaching its conclusion, the Shea court's public policy analysis of the
arbitration provision and application of parens patriae relied on holdings
from other jurisdictions assessing the validity of parental waivers binding
children to exculpatory agreements." 0 The panel followed the reasoning of
Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co.,"' where the Supreme Court of Colorado held
that the state's public policy prevented parents from releasing their children's
potential claims either before or after suffering a personal injury via an ex-
culpatory agreement." 2 The court in Cooper stated: "children still must be
protected against parental actions-perhaps rash and imprudent ones-that
foreclose all of the minor's potential claims for injuries caused by another's
negligence."" 3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal was persuaded by the
Supreme Court of Colorado's "overarching policy"1 4 that protected minors
regardless of the actions of their parents." 
5
Adopting the reasoning in Cooper, the panel then relied on Florida
statutory law and state case law." 6 The statutory basis for the court's ruling
focused on state law that prohibited parents, as the natural guardians of their
children," 7 from binding their children to settle claims over $15,000."' The
ties" since they "serve an important function" for children and the community. Zivich, 696
N.E.2d at 205.
109. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 12 (Wash. 1992) (stating that "the
child would have no recourse against a negligent party to acquire resources needed for care
and this is true regardless of when relinquishment of the child's rights might occur."); Shea 1,
28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005.
110. See id. at D2005-06.
111. 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002).
112. Id.; accord Scott, 48 P.3d at 11-12; Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah
2001). In Cooper, a minor lost vision in both eyes when he was injured in a skiing accident.
Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1232. Before the Supreme Court of Colorado's ruling in the case, the trial
and appellate courts both held that the teenager could not bring action against his coach and
the Aspen Ski club for his injuries because of a release signed by the child's mother. Id. at
1231-32.
113. Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1234.
114. Id.
115. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005.
116. Id.
117. Id. Section 744.301(1) of the 2002 Florida Statutes states, "[t]he mother and father
jointly are natural guardians of their own children and of their natural guardians of their own
children and of their adopted children, during minority." FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (2002).
118. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004. Section 744.387(2) of the Florida Statutes re-
quires the court to appoint a legal guardian to a minor when the child's settlement claim will
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panel also based their rationale on Florida cases holding that parents could
not release their child's ability to file compulsory counterclaims,' 9 waive
their child's privilege concerning patient-psychotherapist confidentiality,120
and enter into private agreements for child support and custody absent court
approval.' 2' Interestingly, the panel did not provide great explanation or
analysis on another Florida case that it relied upon that shared similarities
with Shea.22 In Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc., 23 the court held that a child
who had been injured while horseback riding could file a cause of action
against the defendant for its negligence although the minor had signed a re-
lease of liability.2 4 Public policy, the Dilallo court reasoned, prevented chil-
dren from being bound to contractual pre-injury waivers signed by minors
and also allowed children to pursue legal claims.
25
V. THE SHEA COURT'S RULING WAS PROPER UNDER PUBLIC POLICY AND
PARENS PA TRIAE
The ruling in Shea has drawn criticism on some fronts as being inap-
propriate, impractical-and unconstitutional 126 -- intermeddling into parents'
decision-making and authority.2 7 Detractors may assert that the verdict re-
flects the court's distrust for parental discretion. 2  However, "[p]ublic pol-
exceed $15,000. § 744.301(2)-(3). If the settlement amount is less than $15,000, then the
child is bound to the settlement amount negotiated by the child's parents. Id.
119. See Romish v. Albo, 291 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
120. See Attorney ad Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K., 780 So. 2d 301, 308 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a seventeen-year-old girl had patient-psychotherapist privi-
lege that could not be waived or asserted by parents).
121. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005; see also Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 267
(Fla. 1976) (holding that an illegitimate minor's right to child support cannot be released by
mother's contract because the child's rights and benefits are affected).
122. Like Shea, the case of Dilallo v. Riding Sqfely, Inc., 687 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) was also a case of first impression in Florida and was heard by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 357.
125. See id.
126. Appellee's Answer Brief at 24, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004 (No. 4D02-910).
On appeal, Global argued that the "fundamental due process rights to raise and control their
children" were at issue in Shea. Id. Global asserted that a parent's right included the ability
to choose the activities for their children, "whether it be participating on a soccer team or
traveling on an African safari." Id. at 26. Agreeing to arbitrate or release a minor's claims,
Global claimed, were the rights parents "must have" to raise their children. See id.
127. Cunningham, supra note 7.
128. See Brian A. Dominic, Note, The Children [and the Timorous May] Stay At Home:
Hawkins v. Peart, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 601, 618.
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icy is the cornerstone-the foundation-of all constitutions, statutes, and
judicial decisions; and its latitude and longitude, its height and its depth,
greater than any or all of them."' 29 The primary principle of public policy is
justice. 130
When a parent agrees to arbitrate the personal injury claims suffered by
their children and deprive the minor of the right to a jury trial-or in Shea,
the estate of a child to seek legal relief-when the child is injured as a result
of another party's tortious act or negligence, there is an injustice.' 3 ' The par-
ents are allowing a liable party to escape any harsh repercussions from their
tortious or negligent actions.'32 Regardless of their intentions and motiva-
tions,'33 when a parent forecloses his or her child's right to recover'34 "carte
blanche,"' 35 the need for commercial enterprises to adhere to the reasonable
standard of care loses its significance. 36 After the court's ruling in Shea,
however, businesses in Florida will not be able to use arbitration agreements
to prevent juries from hearing the personal injury claims brought by mi-
nors.' 37 Commercial enterprises will also be more vigilant to prevent chil-
dren from being injured as a result of the company's negligence.' 38
Parents often have to decide whether to release their child's claims
against potential tortfeasors and other negligent parties.'39 However, parents
may not fully understand the significance or the legal repercussions for their
children when parents-including parents who are also attorneys'a-bind
minors to arbitrate potential causes of action. 4' Parents must address the
129. City of Leesburg v. Ware, 153 So. 87, 89-90 (Fla. 1934) (adopting and quoting opin-
ion from Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 506-
07 (Ohio 1916)).
130. See Ware, 153 So. 87 at 89.
131. See Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2002); Scott v. Pac. W.
Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 9 (Wash. 1992).
132. See Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1237.
133. Angeline Purdy, Note, Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort: Erroneously Invali-
dating Parental Releases of a Minor's Future Claim, 68 WASH. L. REV. 457, 474 (1993)
(criticizing the Supreme Court of Washington's ruling in Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort,
834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992)).
134. Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 200 1).
135. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
136. Hawkins, 37 P.3d at 1066.
137. See Olmeda, supra note 81.
138. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, No Signing Safety Away, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, July 12,
2002, available at 2002 WL I No. 26 ABAJEREP 3.
139. See Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1234; Cahill, supra note 138.
140. See Bierman & Hutchinson, supra note 81. Garrit's mother Molly Bruce Jacobs is an
attorney. Id.
141. See Cahill, supra note 138; Andrew Murr, Sports Waivers: An Exercise in Futility?,
31 J.L. & EDUC. 114, 120 (2002).
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repercussions of signing parental agreements, conferring arbitration provi-
sions on a daily basis.'42 A parent's decision to release the tortfeasor of li-
ability undermines the parent's responsibility to protect the welfare of his or
her child.'43 Children need to be shielded from the sometimes unsophisti-
cated and naive decisions made by their parents.'" The state has an obliga-
tion to care and protect the interests of minors, 45 and the courts zealously
have to assert their role under parens patriae to ensure the welfare of chil-
dren. 46 As illustrated by its reliance on statutory and case law favoring the
protection of children, 47 the Shea panel properly recognized and invoked its
paramount rights under parens patriae.1
48
Before their children can participate in athletic activities, school clubs,
and community organizations, parents are generally required to waive their
child's legal right to seek relief.149 A majority of jurisdictions hold that pa-
rental waivers for these activities are not valid without prior judicial or statu-
tory approval' 50 and are violative of public policy. 5' However, when the
detriments of parental waivers containing arbitration provisions for com-
monplace children's activities are balanced with the social benefits of par-
ticipation in these functions, "[p]ublic policy does not forbid such an agree-
ment. In fact, public policy supports it.' ' 52 The courts and legislatures may
prohibit exculpatory agreements in common children's activities, but paren-
tal waivers for child-oriented activities promote public policy.'53 There is a
142. Stephanie Levy, Parent Cannot Contract Away Child's Right to Sue, TRIAL, Feb.
2002, at 97 (discussing Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1062 (Utah 2001).
143. Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2002); Hawkins, 37 P.3d at
1067.
144. Contra Robert S. Nelson, Comment, The Theory of the Waiver Scale: An Argument
Why Parents Should Be Able to Waive Their Children's Tort Liability Claims, 36 U.S.F. L.
REV. 535, 568 (2002).
145. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992); Cooper, 48 P.3d
at 1234.
146. See McLaughlin, supra note 68, at 930.
147. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005.
148. See Appellant's Brief at 15, Shea 11, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D1009 (No. 4D02-910)
(citing Hancock v. Dupree, 129 So. 822, 823 (Fla. 1930) (holding that "[t]he court, when
asked to restore an infant, is not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, but is to
give it due weight as a claim founded on human nature, and generally equitable and just")).
149. See Schalley, supra note 1, at 200; Nelson, supra note 144, at 560; Melinda Smith,
Note, Tort Immunity for Volunteers in Ohio: Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 32 AKRON
L. REV. 699, 714 (1999).
150. Id. at 714-15.
151. Murr, supra note 141, at 114.
152. Nelson, supra note 144, at 560 (quoting Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696
N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ohio 1998)).
153. SeeMurr, supranote 141, at 117.
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need for recreational activities for children'54 because minors benefit from
participating in organizations and functions that are conducted by schools,
volunteers, and parents.'55 Although minors voluntarily give up their right to
seek legal relief, community and school oriented activities provide children
with the opportunity to learn life skills and team building skills.'56 In turn,
the community at large benefits because community organizations, athletic
associations, and school-sponsored clubs can continue to operate and provide
opportunities for children.'57
However, there are possible concerns relating to the Shea court's vali-
dation of parental waivers with arbitration provisions for children's commu-
nity activities. Validating parental waivers for school-related functions and
organized sports leagues could cause youth organizations to lower the stan-
dard of care that ensures the safety of minors because these entities can es-
cape potential liability.'58 Allowing these organizations to avoid possible
liability contravenes public policy because children could be subjected to
unnecessary hazards produced by negligent actions and a lack of account-
ability. 59 The issue of parental waivers with arbitration clauses for chil-
dren's activities and the potential drop in the standard of care by youth or-
ganizations is a topic that will have to be monitored by the courts. Until
then, however, "[e]very learning experience involves risk."' 60
VI. INADEQUACIES OF THE COURT'S RULING IN SHEA
Like the panel in Shea, courts routinely apply public policy as the foun-
dation for their holdings when there is not a statutory or constitutional basis
for their decisions.' 6' Since Shea was a case of first impression, the Fourth
154. Purdy, supra note 133, at 475.
155. Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (4th Ct. App. 1990);
Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205. In Hohe, a fifteen-year-old girl was injured when she volunteered
to participate in a hypnotism show sponsored by her school's parent-teacher-student associa-
tion. Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 648. Although the minor and her father had signed a waiver
form as a condition to her participation in the show, the father still attempted to hold the
school, the association, and the school district liable for her injuries. Id. However, the appel-
late court ruled that the release was not void against public policy. Id. at 649. For a summary
of Zivich, see 696 N.E.2d at 205.
156. See Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649; Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205.
157. Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649; Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205.
158. Mark Seiberling, Note, Icing on the Cake: Allowing Amateur Athletic Promoters to
Escape Liability in Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 417,418 (2002).
Contra Purdy, supra note 133, at 475-76.
159. See Seiberling, supra note 158, at 417-18, 448.
160. Hohe, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
161. Purdy, supra note 133, at 464.
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District Court of Appeal's public policy decision will now serve as the
source for other similar rulings in the state unless the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida decides to hear the case as a matter of great public importance and render
an opinion. 62  Since the value of public policy is a variable concept, 163 a
court has a duty to clearly assert the principles that underlie its decision to
ensure that future rulings will remain consistent) 64 Verdicts that lack con-
viction or are vague make it difficult to apply and gauge legal standards. 65
The Shea panel articulated its public policy rationale as it related to par-
ents contracting on behalf of their children.'66 However, in applying its pub-
lic policy rationale, the court was ambiguous in some portions of its legal
analysis. Specifically, the court was silent-or was not clear--on the stan-
dard used to gauge the arbitration provision in Shea.6 7 If the Federal Arbi-
tration Act ("FAA") 168 did not apply to the provision, then the Florida Arbi-
tration Code 69 should have governed the agreement. 7° However, the district
court did not provide a governing standard of arbitration.
The court was also correct in its validation of parental waivers for
"commonplace child oriented ...or school supported activities."'' How-
ever, the Fourth District Court of Appeal did not specify what activities
would fall under the ambit of the panel's opinion. 72 The lack of clarity used
by the Shea panel in its rationale has created uncertainty' and casts doubt
on the legality of the court's verdict. 7 4 For the sake of legal consistency, the
court should have engaged and fully articulated the basis for its ruling.'75
A. The Court's Silence on an Arbitration Standard
The irony of the district court's silence on applying an arbitration stan-
dard in Shea is that both the Florida Arbitration Code and the FAA were
162. See id.
163. City of Leesburg v. Ware, 153 So. 87, 89 (Fla. 1934).
164. Purdy, supra note 133, at 465.
165. See id.
166. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
167. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
168. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
169. FLA. STAT. § 682.01-.22 (2002).
170. See Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 427.
171. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
172. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
173. Id.
174. See Purdy, supra note 133, at 465.
175. See id.
[Vol. 28:1:167
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 8
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/8
BINDING A RBITRA TION A GREEMENTS
applicable.'76 The Shea panel stated that Florida law would determine which
parties had entered into a valid binding arbitration agreement.' 77 Based on
the court's language, it would appear that the district court was applying the
Florida Arbitration Code 7 to govern the controversy. The Florida Arbitra-
tion Code applies to any written agreement or contractual provision between
two or more parties where the parties agree to arbitrate any dispute that may
arise during their transaction. 79 Agreements under the state's arbitration
laws are "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable"' 8 ° unless the parties stipulate
that the Florida Arbitration Code will not apply to the dispute,' 8' or if the
agreement states that arbitration will take place in another jurisdiction. 8 2
Jacobs and Global agreed to arbitrate any controversy that arose from
the tour contract; the arbitration provision did not expressly state that the
Florida Arbitration Code would not apply to the controversy.'83 The provi-
sion also stated that arbitration would be held in Fort Lauderdale,'84 which
gave the district court jurisdiction under the Florida Arbitration Code. 85 All
of these elements allowed the district court to utilize the Florida Arbitration
Code in its analysis. However, the court refused or was reluctant to do so.
86
The Shea panel's silence on the Florida Arbitration Code indicates that the
court did not believe it was necessary to factor in the state's arbitration laws
into its analysis or to be clear on its application of relevant state law.
The Florida Arbitration Code was not applied in Shea because, ar-
guendo, a court's analysis of an arbitration provision and a motion to compel
arbitration are the same under Florida law and federal law.'8 7 In addition,
176. See also Cross v. Carmes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ohio 11th Ct. App. 1998) (stating
that the Ohio arbitration statute and FAA were referable to arbitration action).
177. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005.
178. FLA. STAT. § 682.01-.22 (2002).
179. § 682.02.
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also Wickes Corp. v. Indus. Fin. Corp., 493 F.2d 1173, 1175 (5th Cir. 1974)
(ruling that the Florida Arbitration Code does not apply to contract when parties expressly
agree that statute will not be applied).
182. See Damora v. Stresscon Int'l, Inc., 324 So. 2d 80, 81-82 (Fla. 1975) (holding that
the provision to arbitrate future controversies in New York City did not apply to and was
outside the authority of the Florida Arbitration Code).
183. See Appellant's Brief at 5, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006 (No. 4D02-9 10).
184. Id.
185. See Damora, 324 So. 2d at 81-82.
186. Shea /, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
187. Benedict v. Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc., 846 So. 2d 1238, 1241-42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (citing the Supreme Court of Florida's analysis in Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750
So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999)). The existence of a valid written arbitration agreement, the exis-
tence of arbitrable issues, and the possible waiver of the right to arbitrate are the three factors
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since section two of the FAA is applicable in state and federal courts, 188 the
FAA preempts Florida law because of the national policy favoring arbitra-
tion. "' The preemptive power of the FAA is limited to maritime transactions
and contracts involving interstate commerce.' 90 The transaction in Shea did
involve interstate commerce-Maryland residents entered into the arbitration
agreement with a Florida corporation' 91 as part of a contract for a safari in
two African countries.192 The elements at bar allowed the district court to
utilize the FAA to govern the dispute in Shea.'93 However, the Shea panel
never addressed nor articulated the issue of the applicability of the FAA.' 94
The court's silence or lack of clarity on an arbitration standard carries
legal significance because it involves the "severability" of Shea's arbitration
provision.' 95 When arbitration clauses are governed by the FAA, state courts
are allowed to sever the arbitration provision "from the contracts in which
they are embedded."' 196 However, state courts are only permitted to deter-
mine the validity of the arbitration clause but cannot consider the validity of
the entire contract.'97 If the district court first decided that the arbitration
Florida courts use in their analyses of a motion to compel arbitration under the Florida Arbi-
tration Code or the FAA. Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636.
188. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984); Bagot & Henderson,
supra note 2, at 427.
189. See Keating, 465 U.S. at 10; Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 427.
190. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Bagot & Henderson, supra note 2, at 419-20. Under the FAA,
commerce is defined in part as:
Commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United
States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between
any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and
any State or Territory or foreign nation ....
9 U.S.C. § 1.
191. Shea 111, 2002 WL 215330, at *2. The tour contract was signed by Jacobs, who also
signed the agreement on Garrit's behalf. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2005. Global is a Fort
Lauderdale-based corporation. See id.
192. Appellee's Answer Brief at 12, Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004 (No. 4D02-910).
193. See Shea 111, 2002 WL 215330, at *2. Aside from Accomazzo v. CEDU Educ. Servs.,
15 P.3d 1153 (Idaho 2000), all of the other cases involving binding arbitration and the per-
sonal injury/tort claims of minors previously discussed in this Note did utilize the FAA. See
Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 2002); Costanza v. Allstate
Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.02-1492, 2002 WL 31528447, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2002); Troshak v.
Terminix Int'l Corp., L.P., No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401963, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 2,
1998); Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio 1 ith Ct. App. 1998).
194. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
195. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1967).
"[T]he question of 'severability' is one of state law . I..." ld. at 403. The Florida Arbitration
Code does allow issues subject to arbitration to be severed. FLA. STAT. § 682.03(3) (2002).
196. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402.
197. Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 833; see Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404.
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clause in the tour contract was not valid, it would have been proper for the
court to then determine the validity of the entire agreement.'98 The Shea
panel did not clearly articulate if it was severing the arbitration provision
from the rest of the tour contract to determine its validity.'99 Nevertheless,
the district court concluded that the arbitration provision was not valid be-
cause the contract-i.e., the parental waiver-lacked validity."' If the court
did apply the FAA to the dispute, did sever the arbitration provision from the
tour contract, and found that the arbitration clause was not valid because of
the contract's invalidity, then the Shea panel contravened precedent.20 1
B. The Court's Ambiguity Concerning Children's "Commonplace Child
Oriented or School Supported Activities " 202
The ruling in Shea delivers a clear statement that the courts will be vigi-
lant to safeguard the well-being of children. 23 However, aside from parental
waivers for medical services and insurance coverage, the district court did
not clearly specify other circumstances where judicial vigilance will be pre-
sent.2°4 The panel did allow for waivers for school sponsored and commu-
nity activities, but it stopped short of articulating what particular functions
would be permitted under the court's ruling.205 The ambiguity of the deci-
sion adds to the "confusion and inconsistency that currently plagues ' 2 6 pa-
rental waivers and arbitration agreements. 2 7 The ruling does not provide any
guidelines for parental discretion for certain activities, 20 and the legality of
parental consent forms containing arbitration provisions for various activi-
ties-field trips, scuba diving, camping, horseback riding, and theme
parks, 2 9 for example-will consistently be called into question. 210 This un-
198. See Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 835.
199. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004. The district court's only detectable analysis
of the severability issue concerns its acknowledgement of the trial court's decision to sever the
arbitration clause from the parental release. See id. at D2005.
200. See id. at D2004-05.
201. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403; Cross, 724 N.E.2d at 833.
202. Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2006.
203. See Sara Hoffman Jurand, Parent Cannot Sign Away Child's Rights, Colorado Court
Rules, TRIAL, Sept. 2002, at 82 (quoting Howard Davidson, director of the ABA Center on
Children and the Law, after the Supreme Court of Colorado's ruling in Cooper v. Aspen Ski-
ing Co., 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002)).
204. See Cunningham, supra note 7.
205. Id.
206. Nelson, supra note 144, at 556.
207. See id.
208. Cunningham, supra note 7 (quoting family law attorney Richard Milstein).
209. Id.; Olmeda, supra note 81.
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certainty will cause other courts to determine what is a commonplace activity
for children,2 ' which will create a backlog in the court system.1 2
The lack of clarity concerning children's community oriented and
school supported functions also places an undue burden on businesses.2 3
Service providers will not be aware or sure of the validity of the waivers and
arbitration provisions they require parents to sign in order to avoid any liabil-
ity.21 4 It is fundamentally unfair for businesses not to know if their parental
waivers will protect them from potential lawsuits.21 5 Some businesses who
are unsure about the legality of their exculpatory agreements and arbitration
clauses may not allow minors to partake in their activities to avoid the risk of
potential litigation.2 6 As a result, children will be deprived of "recreational
and adventuresome activities ' 2 7 and various industries that cater to minors
will suffer.218
VII. CONCLUSION
As long as commercial arbitration continues to be a preferred method of
settling disputes, cases like Shea will undoubtedly become commonplace in
Florida and in other jurisdictions. However, the feasibility and appeal of
arbitration in Florida will have to be reconsidered in light of the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's groundbreaking ruling in Shea.2 9 Regardless of the
enterprise or activity, contracts entered into by parents on behalf of their
children that have arbitration provisions now lack validity if Shea's holding
remains unscathed. 2 0 The willingness of the Florida Legislature and judici-
ary to safeguard the legal interests of the state's children22" ' will override the
benefits arbitration offers litigants. Public policy and parens patriae should
be paramount when minors are deprived of their procedural and substantive
legal rights-often unknowingly-by their parents.
210. Id.; see Cunningham, supra note 7.
211. Id. (quoting Family Law Attorney Richard Milstein).
212. Id. (quoting Rodney Gould, attorney for Global).
213. See Nelson, supra note 144, at 556.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id.; Purdy, supra note 133, at 475; Dominic, supra note 128, at 618.
217. Dominic, supra note 128, at 619.
218. See id.; Cunningham, supra note 7.
219. Olmeda, supra note 81.
220. See discussion supra note 12 (discussing Shea's possible legal future).
221. See Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County Inc.'s Brief as Amicus Curiae at 4,
Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004 (No. 4D02-910) ("Florida state courts have been strong
proponents in establishing and protecting children's rights").
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Until there is legislative action to amend Florida's existing arbitration
laws, public policy and parens patriae should be inherent elements of a
court's legal analysis when a child's potential causes of action are in ques-
tion. However, in conducting their analyses, Florida courts, unlike the Shea
panel, should clearly articulate and assess both the public policy and legal
concerns involved."' Failing to do so will provide little guidance for courts
that will have to address this emerging legal issue. The Supreme Court of
Florida will see the need to resolve the issues raised in Shea, and in doing so,
the court will find that public policy and judicial vigilance for the protection
of the state's children will be the overriding factors in affirming the district
court's ruling.
222. See Shea 1, 28 Fla. L. Weekly at D2004.
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